About money, see CONTRIBUTING.md
Security is very important to us. If you discover any issue regarding security, please disclose
the information responsibly by sending an email from Protonmail to security@wekan.fi
that is Protomail email address, or by using this PGP key
security-at-wekan.fi.asc to security@wekan.fi
and not by creating a GitHub issue. We will respond swiftly to fix verifiable security issues.
We thank you with a place at our hall of fame page, that is at https://wekan.fi/hall-of-fame
How should reports be formatted?
Name: %name
Twitter: %twitter
Bug type: %bugtype
Domain: %domain
Severity: %severity
URL: %url
PoC: %poc
CVSS (optional): %cvss
CWSS (optional): %cwss
Who can participate in the program
Anyone who reports a unique security issue in scope and does not disclose it to
a third party before we have patched and updated may be upon their approval
added to the Wekan Hall of Fame.
Which domains are in scope?
No public domains, because all those are donated to Wekan Open Source project,
and we don't have any permissions to do security scans on those donated servers.
Please don't perform research that could impact other users. Secondly, please keep
the reports short and succinct. If we fail to understand the logics of your bug, we will tell you.
You can Install Wekan to your own computer
and scan it's vulnerabilities there.
About Wekan versions
There are only 2 versions of Wekan: Standalone Wekan, and Sandstorm Wekan.
Standalone Wekan Security
Standalone Wekan includes all non-Sandstorm platforms. Some Standalone Wekan platforms
like Snap and Docker have their own specific sandboxing etc features.
Standalone Wekan by default does not load any files from Internet, like fonts, CSS, etc.
This also means all Standalone Wekan functionality works in offline local networks.
WeKan is used at most countries of the world https://snapcraft.io/wekan
and by by companies that have 30k users.
- Wekan private board attachments are not accessible without logging in.
- There is feature to set board public, so that board is visible without logging in in readonly mode, with realtime updates.
- Admin Panel has feature to disable all public boards, so all boards are private.
SSL/TLS
- SSL/TLS encrypts traffic between webbrowser and webserver.
- If you are thinking about TLS MITM, look at https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/2530
- Let's Encrypt TLS requires publicly accessible webserver, that Let's Encrypt TLS validation servers check.
- If firewall limits to only allowed IP addresses, you may need non-Let's Encrypt TLS cert.
- For On Premise:
XSS
QA about PubSub
Q:
Hello,
I have just seen the Meteor DevTools Evolved extension and was wondering if anyone had asked themselves the question of security.
Insofar as all data is shown in the minimongo tab in plain text.
How can data be hidden from this extension?
A:
PubSub
- It is not security issue to show some text or image, that user has permission to see. It is a security issue, if browserside is some text or image that user should not see.
- Meteor has browserside minimongo database, made with Javascript, updated with Publish/Subscribe, PubSub.
- Publish/Subscribe means, that realtime web framework reads database changes stream, and then immediately updates webpage,
like like dashboards, chat, kanban. That is the point in any realtime web framework in any programming language.
- Yes, you should check with Meteor DevTools Evolved Chromium/Firefox extension that at minimongo is only text that user has permission to see.
- Do checking as logged in user, and logged out user.
- Check permissions and sanitize before allowing some change, because someone could modify content of input field,
PubSub/websocket data (for example with Burp Suite Community Edition), etc.
- If you have REST API, also check that only those that have login token, and have permission, can view or edit text
- You should not include any data user is not allowed to see. Not to webpage text, not to websockets/PubSub, etc.
- Minimongo should not have password hashes PubSub https://wekan.github.io/hall-of-fame/userbleed/
- PubSub uses Websockets, so you need those to be enabled at webserver like Caddy/Nginx/Apache etc, examples of settings
at right menu of https://github.com/wekan/wekan/wiki
- Clientside https://github.com/wekan/wekan/tree/main/client/components subscribes to
PubSub https://github.com/wekan/wekan/tree/main/server/publications or calls meteor methods at https://github.com/wekan/wekan/tree/main/models
- For Admin:
- If there is a lot of data, use pagination https://github.com/wekan/wekan/blob/main/client/components/settings/peopleBody.js
- Only have limited amount of data published in PubSub. Limit in MongoDB query in publications how much is published. Too much could make browser too slow.
- Use Environment variables for any email etc passwords.
- But what if you would like to remove minimongo? And only use Meteor methods for saving? In that case, you don't have realtime updates,
and you need to write much more code to load and save data yourself, handle any multi user data saving conflicts yourself,
and many Meteor Atmospherejs.com PubSub using packages would not work anymore https://github.com/wekan/we
PubSub: Fix that user can not change to Admin
Permissions and Roles
Environment variables
- For any passwords, use environment variables, those are serverside
Do not copy environment variable to public variable that is visible browserside https://github.com/wekan/wekan/blob/main/server/max-size.js
Meteor.startup(() => {
if (process.env.HEADER_LOGIN_ID) {
Meteor.settings.public.attachmentsUploadMaxSize = process.env.ATTACHMENTS_UPLOAD_MAX_SIZE;
Meteor.settings.public.attachmentsUploadMimeTypes = process.env.ATTACHMENTS_UPLOAD_MIME_TYPES;
Meteor.settings.public.avatarsUploadMaxSize = process.env.AVATARS_UPLOAD_MAX_SIZE;
For serverside, you can set Meteor.settings.variablename, without text public
For WeKan kanban, there is feature for setting board public, it can be viewed by anyone, there is realtime updates. But
Some of those permissions are checked at users.js models at https://github.com/wekan/wekan/tree/main/models
Environment variables are used for email server passwords, etc, at all platforms https://github.com/wekan/wekan/commit/a781c0e7dcfdbe34c1483ee83cec12455b7026f7
Escape HTML comment tags so that HTML comments are visible
Attachments: XSS in filename is sanitized
Attachments: Forced download to prevent stored XSS
- To prevent browser-side execution of uploaded content under the app origin, all attachment downloads are served with safe headers:
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Disposition: attachment
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- A restrictive
Content-Security-Policy with sandbox
- This means attachments are downloaded instead of rendered inline by default. This mitigates HTML/JS/SVG based stored XSS vectors.
- Avatars and inline images remain supported but SVG uploads are blocked and never rendered inline.
Users: Client update restrictions
- Client-side updates to user documents are limited to safe fields only:
- Sensitive fields are blocked from any client updates and can only be modified by server methods with authorization:
orgs, teams, roles, isAdmin, createdThroughApi, loginDisabled, authenticationMethod, services.*, emails.*, sessionData.*
- Attempts to update forbidden fields from the client are denied.
- Admin operations like managing org/team membership or toggling flags must use server methods that check permissions.
Voting: integrity and authorization
- Client updates to card
vote fields are blocked to prevent forged votes and inconsistent policy enforcement.
- Voting is performed via a server method that enforces:
- Authentication and board membership, or an explicit per-card flag allowing non-members to vote.
- Only the caller's own userId is added/removed from
vote.positive/vote.negative.
- This prevents members from fabricating other users' votes and ensures non-members cannot vote unless explicitly allowed.
Planning Poker: integrity and authorization
- Client updates to card
poker fields are blocked. All poker actions go through server methods that enforce:
- Authentication and board membership for configuration and results.
- For casting a poker vote, either board membership or an explicit per-card flag allowing non-members to participate.
- Only the caller's own userId is added/removed from the selected estimation bucket (e.g., one, two, five, etc.).
- Methods cover setting/unsetting poker question/end, casting votes, replaying, and setting final estimation.
Attachment API: authentication and DoS prevention
- The attachment API (
/api/attachment/*) requires proper authentication using X-User-Id and X-Auth-Token headers.
- Authentication validates tokens by hashing with
Accounts._hashLoginToken and matching against stored login tokens, preventing identity spoofing.
- Request handlers implement:
- 30-second timeout to prevent hanging connections.
- Request body size limits (50MB for uploads, 10MB for metadata operations).
- Proper error handling and guaranteed response completion.
- Request error event handlers to clean up failed connections.
- This prevents:
- DoS attacks via concurrent unauthenticated or malformed requests.
- Identity spoofing by using arbitrary bearer tokens or user IDs.
- Resource exhaustion from hanging connections or excessive payloads.
- Access control: all attachment operations verify board membership before allowing access.
Brute force login protection
Sandstorm Wekan Security
On Sandstorm platform using environment variable Standalone Wekan features like Admin Panel etc are
turned off, because Sandstorm platform provides SSO for all apps running on Sandstorm.
Sandstorm is separate Open Source platform that has been
security audited and found bugs fixed.
Sandstorm also has passwordless login, LDAP, SAML, Google etc auth options already.
At Sandstorm code is read-only and signed by app maintainers, only grain content can be modified.
Wekan at Sandstorm runs in sandboxed grain, it does not have access elsewhere without user-visible
PowerBox request or opening randomly-generated API key URL.
Also read Sandstorm Security Practices and
Sandstorm Security non-events.
For Sandstorm specific security issues you can contact kentonv by email.
What Wekan bugs are eligible?
Any typical web security bugs. If any of the previously mentioned is somehow problematic and
a security issue, we'd like to know about it, and also how to fix it:
- Cross-site Scripting
- Open redirect
- Cross-site request forgery
- File inclusion
- Authentication bypass
- Server-side code execution
What Wekan bugs are NOT eligible?
Typical already known or "no impact" bugs such as:
- Wekan API old tokens not replaced correctly
- Missing Cookie flags on non-session cookies or 3rd party cookies
- Logout CSRF
- Social engineering
- Denial of service
- SSL BEAST/CRIME/etc. Wekan does not have SSL built-in, it uses Caddy/Nginx/Apache etc at front.
Integrated Caddy support is updated often.
- Email spoofing, SPF, DMARC & DKIM. Wekan does not include email server.
Wekan is Open Source with MIT license, and free to use also for commercial use.
We welcome all fixes to improve security by email to security@wekan.team
Bonus Points
If your Responsible Security Disclosure includes code for fixing security issue,
you get bonus points, as seen on Hall of Fame.