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Frequently asked questions
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==========================
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-Which platforms are supported?
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- Currently Linux, FreeBSD and MacOS X are supported.
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- OpenBSD and NetBSD work also, except for xattrs and ACLs.
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-
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- You can try your luck on other POSIX-like systems, like Cygwin,
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- other BSDs, etc. but they are not officially supported.
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-
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Can I backup VM disk images?
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- Yes, the :ref:`deduplication <deduplication_def>` technique used by |project_name|
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- makes sure only the modified parts of the file are stored.
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+ Yes, the :ref:`deduplication <deduplication_def>` technique used by
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+ |project_name| makes sure only the modified parts of the file are stored.
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Also, we have optional simple sparse file support for extract.
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Can I backup from multiple servers into a single repository?
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@@ -47,9 +40,10 @@ Which file types, attributes, etc. are preserved?
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* BSD flags on OS X and FreeBSD
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Which file types, attributes, etc. are *not* preserved?
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- * UNIX domain sockets (because it does not make sense - they are meaningless
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- without the running process that created them and the process needs to
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- recreate them in any case). So, don't panic if your backup misses a UDS!
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+ * UNIX domain sockets (because it does not make sense - they are
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+ meaningless without the running process that created them and the process
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+ needs to recreate them in any case). So, don't panic if your backup
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+ misses a UDS!
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* The precise on-disk representation of the holes in a sparse file.
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Archive creation has no special support for sparse files, holes are
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backed up as (deduplicated and compressed) runs of zero bytes.
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@@ -77,52 +71,51 @@ When backing up to remote servers, do I have to trust the remote server?
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Yes, as an attacker with access to the remote server could delete (or
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otherwise make unavailable) all your backups.
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-If a backup stops mid-way, does the already-backed-up data stay there? I.e. does |project_name| resume backups?
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- Yes, during a backup a special checkpoint archive named ``<archive-name>.checkpoint`` is saved every 5 minutes
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- containing all the data backed-up until that point. This means that at most 5 minutes worth of data needs to be
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- retransmitted if a backup needs to be restarted.
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+If a backup stops mid-way, does the already-backed-up data stay there?
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+ Yes, |project_name| supports resuming backups.
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+ During a backup a special checkpoint archive named ``<archive-name>.checkpoint``
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+ is saved every checkpoint interval (the default value for this is 5
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+ minutes) containing all the data backed-up until that point. This means
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+ that at most <checkpoint interval> worth of data needs to be retransmitted
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+ if a backup needs to be restarted.
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+ Once your backup has finished successfully, you can delete all ``*.checkpoint``
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+ archives.
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If it crashes with a UnicodeError, what can I do?
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Check if your encoding is set correctly. For most POSIX-like systems, try::
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export LANG=en_US.UTF-8 # or similar, important is correct charset
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-I can't extract non-ascii filenames by giving them on the commandline on OS X!?
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- This is due to different ways to represent some characters in unicode.
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- HFS+ likes the decomposed form while the commandline seems to be the composed
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- form usually. If you run into that, for now maybe just try:
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+I can't extract non-ascii filenames by giving them on the commandline!?
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+ This might be due to different ways to represent some characters in unicode
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+ or due to other non-ascii encoding issues.
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+ If you run into that, try this:
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- - avoiding the non-ascii characters on the commandline by e.g. extracting
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+ - avoid the non-ascii characters on the commandline by e.g. extracting
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the parent directory (or even everything)
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- - try to enter the composed form on the commandline
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- mount the repo using FUSE and use some file manager
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- See issue #143 on the issue tracker for more about this.
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-
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-If I want to run |project_name| on a ARM CPU older than ARM v6?
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- You need to enable the alignment trap handler to fixup misaligned accesses::
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-
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- echo "2" > /proc/cpu/alignment
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-
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Can |project_name| add redundancy to the backup data to deal with hardware malfunction?
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- No, it can't. While that at first sounds like a good idea to defend against some
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- defect HDD sectors or SSD flash blocks, dealing with this in a reliable way needs a lot
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- of low-level storage layout information and control which we do not have (and also can't
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- get, even if we wanted).
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+ No, it can't. While that at first sounds like a good idea to defend against
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+ some defect HDD sectors or SSD flash blocks, dealing with this in a
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+ reliable way needs a lot of low-level storage layout information and
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+ control which we do not have (and also can't get, even if we wanted).
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+
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+ So, if you need that, consider RAID or a filesystem that offers redundant
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+ storage or just make backups to different locations / different hardware.
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- So, if you need that, consider RAID1 or a filesystem that offers redundant storage
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- or just make 2 backups to different locations / different hardware.
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+ See also `ticket 225 <https://github.com/borgbackup/borg/issues/225>`_.
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Can |project_name| verify data integrity of a backup archive?
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- Yes, if you want to detect accidental data damage (like bit rot), use the ``check``
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- operation. It will notice corruption using CRCs and hashes.
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- If you want to be able to detect malicious tampering also, use a encrypted repo.
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- It will then be able to check using CRCs and HMACs.
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+ Yes, if you want to detect accidental data damage (like bit rot), use the
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+ ``check`` operation. It will notice corruption using CRCs and hashes.
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+ If you want to be able to detect malicious tampering also, use a encrypted
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+ repo. It will then be able to check using CRCs and HMACs.
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Why was Borg forked from Attic?
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- Borg was created in May 2015 in response to the difficulty of
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- getting new code or larger changes incorporated into Attic and
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- establishing a bigger developer community / more open development.
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+ Borg was created in May 2015 in response to the difficulty of getting new
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+ code or larger changes incorporated into Attic and establishing a bigger
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+ developer community / more open development.
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More details can be found in `ticket 217
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<https://github.com/jborg/attic/issues/217>`_ that led to the fork.
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