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@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ protocol within Borg.
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The assumed worst-case a server can inflict to a client is a
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denial of repository service.
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-The situation were a server can create a general DoS on the client
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+The situation where a server can create a general DoS on the client
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should be avoided, but might be possible by e.g. forcing the client to
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allocate large amounts of memory to decode large messages (or messages
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that merely indicate a large amount of data follows). The RPC protocol
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@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ The buzhash chunker chunks according to the input data, the chunker's
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parameters and the secret chunker seed (which all influence the chunk boundary
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positions).
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-Small files below some specific threshold (default: 512kiB) result in only one
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+Small files below some specific threshold (default: 512 KiB) result in only one
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chunk (identical content / size as the original file), bigger files result in
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multiple chunks.
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@@ -418,8 +418,8 @@ This chunker yields fixed sized chunks, with optional support of a differently
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sized header chunk. The last chunk is not required to have the full block size
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and is determined by the input file size.
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-Within our attack model, an attacker posessing a specific set of files which
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-he assumes that the victim also posesses (and backups into the repository)
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+Within our attack model, an attacker possessing a specific set of files which
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+he assumes that the victim also possesses (and backups into the repository)
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could try a brute force fingerprinting attack based on the chunk sizes in the
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repository to prove his assumption.
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