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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ level margin: \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]]
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.\" new: \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]]
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.\" new: \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]]
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.in \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]]u
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.in \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]]u
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..
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..
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-.TH "BORG-INIT" "1" "2025-04-18" "" "borg backup tool"
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+.TH "BORG-INIT" "1" "2025-10-31" "" "borg backup tool"
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.SH NAME
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.SH NAME
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borg-init \- Initialize an empty repository
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borg-init \- Initialize an empty repository
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.SH SYNOPSIS
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.SH SYNOPSIS
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@@ -36,97 +36,115 @@ borg-init \- Initialize an empty repository
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borg [common options] init [options] [REPOSITORY]
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borg [common options] init [options] [REPOSITORY]
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.SH DESCRIPTION
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.SH DESCRIPTION
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.sp
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.sp
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-This command initializes an empty repository. A repository is a filesystem
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-directory containing the deduplicated data from zero or more archives.
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-.SS Encryption mode TLDR
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+This command initializes an empty repository. A repository is a
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+filesystem directory containing the deduplicated data from zero or more
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+archives.
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+.SS Encryption mode TL;DR
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.sp
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.sp
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-The encryption mode can only be configured when creating a new repository \-
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-you can neither configure it on a per\-archive basis nor change the
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-encryption mode of an existing repository.
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+The encryption mode can only be configured when creating a new
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+repository. You can neither configure encryption on a per\-archive
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+basis, nor change the encryption mode of an existing repository. You
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+should thus take possible future use into account when deciding on an
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+encryption mode.
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.sp
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.sp
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-Use \fBrepokey\fP:
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+As a general rule of thumb, use \fBrepokey\fP with a strong passphrase:
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.INDENT 0.0
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.INDENT 0.0
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.INDENT 3.5
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.INDENT 3.5
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-.sp
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-.EX
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borg init \-\-encryption repokey /path/to/repo
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borg init \-\-encryption repokey /path/to/repo
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-.EE
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.UNINDENT
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.UNINDENT
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.UNINDENT
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.UNINDENT
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.sp
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.sp
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-Or \fBrepokey\-blake2\fP depending on which is faster on your client machines (see below):
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-.INDENT 0.0
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-.INDENT 3.5
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-.sp
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-.EX
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-borg init \-\-encryption repokey\-blake2 /path/to/repo
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-.EE
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-.UNINDENT
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-.UNINDENT
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-.sp
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-Borg will:
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+However, there are many reasons to choose differently. See the section
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+below for details. In any case, Borg will:
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.INDENT 0.0
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.INDENT 0.0
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.IP 1. 3
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.IP 1. 3
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-Ask you to come up with a passphrase.
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+Ask you to enter a unique and strong passphrase.
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.IP 2. 3
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.IP 2. 3
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-Create a borg key (which contains 3 random secrets. See \fIkey_files\fP).
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+Create a random Borg key (which actually consists of three random
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+secrets, see \fIkey_files\fP for details).
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.IP 3. 3
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.IP 3. 3
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-Encrypt the key with your passphrase.
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+Encrypt the Borg key with your passphrase.
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.IP 4. 3
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.IP 4. 3
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-Store the encrypted borg key inside the repository directory (in the repo config).
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-This is why it is essential to use a secure passphrase.
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+Store the encrypted Borg key inside the repository directory (with
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+\fBrepokey\fP and \fBrepokey\-blake2\fP modes; with \fBkeyfile\fP and
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+\fBkeyfile\-blake2\fP modes the Borg key is stored in your home
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+directory instead, see below). Since we usually have to assume that
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+an attacker could gain access to the repository (that\(aqs why we
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+encrypt the data in the first place), choosing a strong and unique
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+passphrase is absolutely crucial.
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.IP 5. 3
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.IP 5. 3
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-Encrypt and sign your backups to prevent anyone from reading or forging them unless they
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-have the key and know the passphrase. Make sure to keep a backup of
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-your key \fBoutside\fP the repository \- do not lock yourself out by
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-\(dqleaving your keys inside your car\(dq (see \fIborg_key_export\fP).
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-For remote backups the encryption is done locally \- the remote machine
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-never sees your passphrase, your unencrypted key or your unencrypted files.
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-Chunking and id generation are also based on your key to improve
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-your privacy.
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+Encrypt and sign your backups with the Borg key to prevent anyone
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+from reading or forging them unless they have the Borg key \fIand\fP
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+know the passphrase.
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.IP 6. 3
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.IP 6. 3
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-Use the key when extracting files to decrypt them and to verify that the contents of
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-the backups have not been accidentally or maliciously altered.
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+Use the Borg key to decrypt and thus access the data stored in your
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+repository, e.g. when extracting files. The contents can also be
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+verified to detect accidental corruption or malicious tampering.
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.UNINDENT
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.UNINDENT
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+.sp
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+As you can see, you always need \fIboth\fP the Borg key and passphrase to
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+access your data. Thus it\(aqs crucial to keep a backup of your key
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+\fIoutside\fP both the repository and the system you create backups of.
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+You can easily run into a \(dqleaving your keys inside your car\(dq situation
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+otherwise. See \fIborg_key_export\fP to create a backup of your key
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+(e.g., by printing it on paper).
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+.sp
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+Encryption is done locally \- i.e., if you back up to a remote machine,
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+the remote machine neither sees your passphrase, nor your unencrypted
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+Borg key, nor your unencrypted files. Chunking and ID generation are
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+based on your key to improve privacy.
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+.sp
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+\fBAbout hardware acceleration:\fP
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+.sp
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+Borg encrypts data with AES, which is pretty fast thanks to hardware
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+acceleration on basically all modern Intel, AMD, and ARM CPUs since
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+around the early 2010s (very cheap models since the mid\-2010s).
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+.sp
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+As the hashing algorithm, Borg can use either SHA256 or BLAKE2b. ARM
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+CPUs support hardware\-accelerated SHA256 hashing since ARMv7 with NEON
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+(around 2011), or ARMv8 (around 2013). AMD CPUs support it since Zen 1
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+(around 2017), i.e. all AMD Ryzen CPUs. Intel CPUs support it since Ice
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+Lake on mobile (10th gen, around 2021), and Rocket Lake on desktop
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+(11th gen, around 2021). Very cheap models have received support a few
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+years later. If your CPU doesn\(aqt support hardware\-accelerated SHA256
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+hashing, you might want to give BLAKE2b hashing a try \- it\(aqs likely
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+faster then. So, instead of \fBrepokey\fP mode, use \fBrepokey\-blake2\fP
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+(or any of the other \fB\-blake2\fP modes for that matter).
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+.sp
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+Hardware acceleration is always used automatically when available.
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.SS Picking a passphrase
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.SS Picking a passphrase
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.sp
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.sp
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-Make sure you use a good passphrase. Not too short, not too simple. The real
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-encryption / decryption key is encrypted with / locked by your passphrase.
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-If an attacker gets your key, he can\(aqt unlock and use it without knowing the
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-passphrase.
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+Make sure you use a good passphrase. Not too short, not too simple. The
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+real encryption / decryption key is encrypted with / locked by your
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+passphrase. If an attacker gets your borg key, they can\(aqt unlock and use
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+it without knowing the passphrase.
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.sp
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.sp
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-Be careful with special or non\-ascii characters in your passphrase:
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+Be careful with special or non\-ASCII characters in your passphrase:
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.INDENT 0.0
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.INDENT 0.0
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.IP \(bu 2
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.IP \(bu 2
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-Borg processes the passphrase as unicode (and encodes it as utf\-8),
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-so it does not have problems dealing with even the strangest characters.
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+Borg processes the passphrase as Unicode (and encodes it as UTF\-8), so
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+it does not have problems dealing with even the strangest characters.
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.IP \(bu 2
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.IP \(bu 2
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-BUT: that does not necessarily apply to your OS / VM / keyboard configuration.
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+BUT: that does not necessarily apply to your OS / VM / keyboard
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+configuration.
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.UNINDENT
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.UNINDENT
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.sp
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.sp
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-So better use a long passphrase made from simple ascii chars than one that
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-includes non\-ascii stuff or characters that are hard/impossible to enter on
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-a different keyboard layout.
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-.sp
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-You can change your passphrase for existing repos at any time, it won\(aqt affect
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-the encryption/decryption key or other secrets.
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-.SS More encryption modes
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+So it is better to use a long passphrase made from simple ASCII
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+characters than one that includes non\-ASCII characters or characters
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+that are hard or impossible to enter on a different keyboard layout.
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.sp
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.sp
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-Only use \fB\-\-encryption none\fP if you are OK with anyone who has access to
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-your repository being able to read your backups and tamper with their
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-contents without you noticing.
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+You can change your passphrase for existing repositories at any time; it
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+won\(aqt affect the encryption/decryption key or other secrets. See
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+\fIborg_key_change\-passphrase\fP\&.
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+.SS More about encryption modes
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.sp
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.sp
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-If you want \(dqpassphrase and having\-the\-key\(dq security, use \fB\-\-encryption keyfile\fP\&.
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-The key will be stored in your home directory (in \fB~/.config/borg/keys\fP).
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+Choosing the right encryption mode isn\(aqt always easy and many factors
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+can change which mode is best for you. However, note that you can\(aqt
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+really do anything \fIwrong\fP if you choose \fBrepokey\fP with a strong
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+passphrase. So, if you\(aqre not sure, choose \fBrepokey\fP (or
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+\fBrepokey\-blake2\fP, depending on your hardware, see above).
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.sp
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.sp
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-If you do \fBnot\fP want to encrypt the contents of your backups, but still
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-want to detect malicious tampering use \fB\-\-encryption authenticated\fP\&.
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-To normally work with \fBauthenticated\fP repos, you will need the passphrase, but
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-there is an emergency workaround, see \fBBORG_WORKAROUNDS=authenticated_no_key\fP docs.
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-.sp
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-If \fBBLAKE2b\fP is faster than \fBSHA\-256\fP on your hardware, use \fB\-\-encryption authenticated\-blake2\fP,
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-\fB\-\-encryption repokey\-blake2\fP or \fB\-\-encryption keyfile\-blake2\fP\&. Note: for remote backups
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-the hashing is done on your local machine.
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+Borg supports the following encryption modes:
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.\" nanorst: inline-fill
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.\" nanorst: inline-fill
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.
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.
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.TS
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.TS
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@@ -135,25 +153,26 @@ l|l|l|l.
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T{
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T{
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Hash/MAC
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Hash/MAC
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T} T{
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T} T{
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-Not encrypted
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-no auth
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-T} T{
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-Not encrypted,
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-but authenticated
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+Not Encrypted
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T} T{
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T} T{
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Encrypted (AEAD w/ AES)
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Encrypted (AEAD w/ AES)
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-and authenticated
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+T}
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+_
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+T{
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+Not Authenticated
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+T} T{
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+Authenticated
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T}
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T}
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_
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_
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T{
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T{
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SHA\-256
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SHA\-256
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T} T{
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T} T{
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-none
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+\fBnone\fP
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T} T{
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T} T{
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-\fIauthenticated\fP
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+\fBauthenticated\fP
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T} T{
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T} T{
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-repokey
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-keyfile
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+\fBrepokey\fP
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+\fBkeyfile\fP
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T}
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T}
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_
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_
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T{
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T{
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@@ -161,56 +180,106 @@ BLAKE2b
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T} T{
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T} T{
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n/a
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n/a
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T} T{
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T} T{
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-\fIauthenticated\-blake2\fP
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+\fBauthenticated\-blake2\fP
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T} T{
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T} T{
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-\fIrepokey\-blake2\fP
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-\fIkeyfile\-blake2\fP
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+\fBrepokey\-blake2\fP
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+\fBkeyfile\-blake2\fP
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T}
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T}
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.TE
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.TE
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.\" nanorst: inline-replace
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.\" nanorst: inline-replace
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.
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.
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.sp
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.sp
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-Modes \fImarked like this\fP in the above table are new in Borg 1.1 and are not
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-backwards\-compatible with Borg 1.0.x.
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+Borg 1.0 and older support \fBnone\fP, \fBrepokey\fP, and \fBkeyfile\fP
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+modes only. If you need such old clients to be able to access your
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+repo, you can\(aqt use any of the other modes.
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.sp
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.sp
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-On modern Intel/AMD CPUs (except very cheap ones), AES is usually
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-hardware\-accelerated.
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-BLAKE2b is faster than SHA256 on Intel/AMD 64\-bit CPUs
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-(except AMD Ryzen and future CPUs with SHA extensions),
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-which makes \fIauthenticated\-blake2\fP faster than \fInone\fP and \fIauthenticated\fP\&.
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+\fBAbout modes without encryption:\fP
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.sp
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.sp
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-On modern ARM CPUs, NEON provides hardware acceleration for SHA256 making it faster
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-than BLAKE2b\-256 there. NEON accelerates AES as well.
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+Avoid using \fBnone\fP mode. If you think about using \fBnone\fP mode,
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+please reconsider and be absolutely sure. Using any mode other than
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+\fBnone\fP allows Borg to detect accidental corruption or malicious
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+tampering with the repo. It also prevents denial\-of\-service attacks
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+against clients. Instead of \fBnone\fP mode, you likely want to use
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+\fBauthenticated\fP mode, or \fBrepokey\fP or \fBkeyfile\fP modes with an
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+empty passphrase instead (see below).
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.sp
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.sp
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-Hardware acceleration is always used automatically when available.
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+If you don\(aqt want to encrypt your data, use \fBauthenticated\fP or
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+\fBauthenticated\-blake2\fP modes. These modes require a passphrase in
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+normal operation, but in emergency situations you can access the repo
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+without the passphrase with \fBBORG_WORKAROUNDS=authenticated_no_key\fP
|
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|
+(see \fIenvironment\-variables\fP).
|
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|
+.sp
|
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|
+If you just don\(aqt want to choose a passphrase, use \fBkeyfile\fP or
|
|
|
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|
+\fBkeyfile\-blake2\fP modes with an empty passphrase. These modes are
|
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|
+generally safe even without a passphrase, but keeping an offsite
|
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|
|
+backup of the Borg key is also important then. See below for details.
|
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|
+.sp
|
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|
+If you can assure that an attacker can\(aqt gain access to your repo, e.g.
|
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|
|
+when independently encrypting your repository disk or filesystem, you
|
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|
|
|
+can think about using \fBrepokey\fP or \fBrepokey\-blake2\fP modes with an
|
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|
|
+empty passphrase. However, keep in mind that if an attacker still
|
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|
|
+somehow manages to gain access, they have full access to your repo. In
|
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|
+such situations choosing \fBrepokey\fP over \fBauthenticated\fP mode has
|
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|
+the advantage of allowing you to add a passphrase later using
|
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|
|
+\fIborg_key_change\-passphrase\fP\&.
|
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|
+.sp
|
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|
+\fBAbout modes with encryption:\fP
|
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|
+.sp
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+With \fBrepokey\fP and \fBrepokey\-blake2\fP modes the key is stored with
|
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|
+the repo and encrypted with your passphrase. If an attacker gains
|
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|
+access to your repo and knows the passphrase, he can access and tamper
|
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|
|
+with the repo. The repo\(aqs security thus relies on the strength of your
|
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|
|
+passphrase. Creating an offsite backup of your Borg key (e.g., by
|
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|
|
+printing it on paper) is recommended, see \fIborg_key_export\fP\&.
|
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|
+.sp
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|
+If you\(aqre thinking about storing the passphrase on the disk of the
|
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|
+system you\(aqre backing up, consider using the \fBkeyfile\fP method
|
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|
+instead. It generally provides the same or better security then.
|
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|
+.sp
|
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+With \fBkeyfile\fP and \fBkeyfile\-blake2\fP modes the key is stored on your
|
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|
+local machine (in \fB~/.config/borg/keys\fP) instead. An attacker gaining
|
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|
+access to your repo then needs both the Borg key, and your passphrase to
|
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|
|
+access and tamper with the repo. However, if you lose the key, you lose
|
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|
+access to the repo, too. You \fBmust\fP create an offsite backup of your
|
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|
|
|
+Borg key, e.g. by printing it on paper. Storing a copy of the Borg key
|
|
|
|
|
+on the system you\(aqre creating backups of is \fBNOT\fP sufficient. Use
|
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|
|
+\fIborg_key_export\fP to create the backup.
|
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|
+.sp
|
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|
+The \fBkeyfile\fP and \fBkeyfile\-blake2\fP modes allow for \(dqpassphrase and
|
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|
|
+having\-the\-key\(dq security when using a strong passphrase, but can also
|
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|
+be used with an empty passphrase. Storing a (easily readable)
|
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|
+passphrase on the disk of the system you\(aqre backing up with
|
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|
|
+\fBkeyfile\fP and \fBkeyfile\-blake2\fP modes adds no security over using an
|
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|
+empty passphrase.
|
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|
+.sp
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|
+\fBTechnical details:\fP
|
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|
+.sp
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|
+\fBrepokey\fP and \fBkeyfile\fP use AES\-CTR\-256 for encryption and
|
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|
|
|
+HMAC\-SHA256 for authentication in an encrypt\-then\-MAC (EtM)
|
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|
|
|
+construction. The chunk ID hash is HMAC\-SHA256 (with a separate key).
|
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|
|
+These modes are compatible with all Borg versions.
|
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|
|
|
+.sp
|
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|
|
+\fBrepokey\-blake2\fP and \fBkeyfile\-blake2\fP are also authenticated
|
|
|
|
|
+encryption modes, but use BLAKE2b\-256 instead of HMAC\-SHA256 for
|
|
|
|
|
+authentication. The chunk ID hash is a keyed BLAKE2b\-256 hash. These
|
|
|
|
|
+modes are only compatible with Borg 1.1 and later.
|
|
|
|
|
+.sp
|
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|
|
|
+\fBauthenticated\fP mode uses no encryption, but authenticates repo
|
|
|
|
|
+contents through the same HMAC\-SHA256 hash as the \fBrepokey\fP and
|
|
|
|
|
+\fBkeyfile\fP modes (it uses it as the chunk ID hash). The key is stored
|
|
|
|
|
+like \fBrepokey\fP within the repo. This mode is only compatible with
|
|
|
|
|
+Borg 1.1 and later.
|
|
|
|
|
+.sp
|
|
|
|
|
+\fBauthenticated\-blake2\fP is like \fBauthenticated\fP, but uses the keyed
|
|
|
|
|
+BLAKE2b\-256 hash from the other BLAKE2b modes. This mode is only
|
|
|
|
|
+compatible with Borg 1.1 and later.
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
-\fIrepokey\fP and \fIkeyfile\fP use AES\-CTR\-256 for encryption and HMAC\-SHA256 for
|
|
|
|
|
-authentication in an encrypt\-then\-MAC (EtM) construction. The chunk ID hash
|
|
|
|
|
-is HMAC\-SHA256 as well (with a separate key).
|
|
|
|
|
-These modes are compatible with Borg 1.0.x.
|
|
|
|
|
-.sp
|
|
|
|
|
-\fIrepokey\-blake2\fP and \fIkeyfile\-blake2\fP are also authenticated encryption modes,
|
|
|
|
|
-but use BLAKE2b\-256 instead of HMAC\-SHA256 for authentication. The chunk ID
|
|
|
|
|
-hash is a keyed BLAKE2b\-256 hash.
|
|
|
|
|
-These modes are new and \fInot\fP compatible with Borg 1.0.x.
|
|
|
|
|
-.sp
|
|
|
|
|
-\fIauthenticated\fP mode uses no encryption, but authenticates repository contents
|
|
|
|
|
-through the same HMAC\-SHA256 hash as the \fIrepokey\fP and \fIkeyfile\fP modes (it uses it
|
|
|
|
|
-as the chunk ID hash). The key is stored like \fIrepokey\fP\&.
|
|
|
|
|
-This mode is new and \fInot\fP compatible with Borg 1.0.x.
|
|
|
|
|
-.sp
|
|
|
|
|
-\fIauthenticated\-blake2\fP is like \fIauthenticated\fP, but uses the keyed BLAKE2b\-256 hash
|
|
|
|
|
-from the other blake2 modes.
|
|
|
|
|
-This mode is new and \fInot\fP compatible with Borg 1.0.x.
|
|
|
|
|
-.sp
|
|
|
|
|
-\fInone\fP mode uses no encryption and no authentication. It uses SHA256 as chunk
|
|
|
|
|
-ID hash. This mode is not recommended, you should rather consider using an authenticated
|
|
|
|
|
-or authenticated/encrypted mode. This mode has possible denial\-of\-service issues
|
|
|
|
|
-when running \fBborg create\fP on contents controlled by an attacker.
|
|
|
|
|
-Use it only for new repositories where no encryption is wanted \fBand\fP when compatibility
|
|
|
|
|
-with 1.0.x is important. If compatibility with 1.0.x is not important, use
|
|
|
|
|
-\fIauthenticated\-blake2\fP or \fIauthenticated\fP instead.
|
|
|
|
|
-This mode is compatible with Borg 1.0.x.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+\fBnone\fP mode uses no encryption and no authentication. It uses SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
+as chunk ID hash. This mode is not recommended. You should instead
|
|
|
|
|
+consider using an authenticated or authenticated/encrypted mode. This
|
|
|
|
|
+mode has possible denial\-of\-service issues when running \fBborg create\fP
|
|
|
|
|
+on contents controlled by an attacker. See above for alternatives.
|
|
|
|
|
+This mode is compatible with all Borg versions.
|
|
|
.SH OPTIONS
|
|
.SH OPTIONS
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
See \fIborg\-common(1)\fP for common options of Borg commands.
|
|
See \fIborg\-common(1)\fP for common options of Borg commands.
|