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@@ -27,7 +27,13 @@ which is slower.
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Can I backup from multiple servers into a single repository?
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------------------------------------------------------------
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-Yes, but in order for the deduplication used by |project_name| to work, it
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+Yes, this is *possible* from the technical standpoint, but it is
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+*not recommended* from the security perspective. |project_name| is
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+built upon a defined :ref:`attack_model` that cannot provide its
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+guarantees for multiple clients using the same repository. See
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+:ref:`borg_security_critique` for a detailed explanation.
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+
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+Also, in order for the deduplication used by |project_name| to work, it
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needs to keep a local cache containing checksums of all file
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chunks already stored in the repository. This cache is stored in
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``~/.cache/borg/``. If |project_name| detects that a repository has been
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@@ -353,6 +359,34 @@ to change them.
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Security
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########
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+.. _borg_security_critique:
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+
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+Isn't BorgBackup's AES-CTR crypto broken?
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+-----------------------------------------
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+
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+If a nonce (counter) value is reused, AES-CTR mode crypto is broken.
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+
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+To exploit the AES counter management issue, an attacker would need to have
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+access to the borg repository.
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+
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+By tampering with the repo, the attacker could bring the repo into a state so
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+that it reports a lower "highest used counter value" than the one that actually
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+was used. The client would usually notice that, because it rather trusts the
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+clientside stored "highest used counter value" than trusting the server.
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+
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+But there are situations, where this is simply not possible:
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+
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+- If clients A and B used the repo, the client A can only know its own highest
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+ CTR value, but not the one produced by B. That is only known to (B and) the
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+ server (the repo) and thus the client A needs to trust the server about the
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+ value produced by B in that situation. You can't do much about this except
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+ not having multiple clients per repo.
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+
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+- Even if there is only one client, if client-side information is completely
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+ lost (e.g. due to disk defect), the client also needs to trust the value from
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+ server side. You can avoid this by not continuing to write to the repository
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+ after you have lost clientside borg information.
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+
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.. _home_config_borg:
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How important is the $HOME/.config/borg directory?
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